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Comments on Brown et al. (2013) 
 
In the article “The Complex Dynamics of Wishful Thinking” (Brown, Sokal & Friedman, 
December 2013), Brown et al. presented a scathing critique of the work of Fredrickson and 
Losada (2005) on the use of advanced mathematical methods (specifically, nonlinear dynamics) 
in describing changes in human emotions over time, terming it “entirely unfounded” (p. 802). 
However, I feel that although their critique serves an important role in identifying potential flaws 
in the theory, it goes too far by using terms such as “completely illusory „applications‟ of 
mathematics” (p. 812) and may inadvertently discourage junior researchers in pursuing the use of 
mathematical methods in psychology.  
This comment does not venture into the validity of Brown et al.‟s (2013) assertions, as 
this is partly addressed in the reply by Fredrickson (December 2013). Instead, using a simple 
hypothetical example, it offers a perspective on what constitutes a good mathematical model and 
evaluates diverging opinions on the role of such models in psychology and the social sciences. 
Mathematical models are useful insofar as they enable us to simplify and subsequently better 
understand complex processes and phenomena. Suppose, for example, that an experimental 
psychologist who, after administering a treatment to a subject, is able to measure anger levels on 
a 21-point rating scale (ranging from -10, indexing “no anger,” to 10, indexing “extreme anger”) 
at eight discrete time intervals (t = 0, 1, . . . , 7) observes the pattern summarized below: 
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Furthermore, suppose that other experimental psychologists independently replicate this 
experiment and find similar patterns of damped alterations in the levels of anger of their subjects. 
Could we write down a mathematical model that describes the observed changes in anger over 
time? Indeed, the first-order difference equation 
 
……...(1).............…………………. 
 
adequately describes how a subject‟s anger levels evolve over time for some constant |c| < 1, 
where Angert  is the observed level of anger at time t and Anger0 is the initial level of anger. 
Instead of presenting large sets of data every time we discuss the effect of the treatment on an 
arbitrary subject‟s anger levels, we could simply state that the process follows Equation 1. 
Therefore, an important property of mathematical modeling in a psychology context is its 
ability to summarize a complex process (e.g., the temporal evolution of an emotion) into a single 
equation. Of course, one can suggest other mathematical models that capture the data presented 
in our example. The researcher‟s goal is thus to choose the model that best represents the 
underlying psychological process under study. Myung (2000) argued that this is not necessarily 
the model that provides the best fit for a given set of data, since a highly complex model can 
provide a good fit without necessarily bearing any interpretable relationship with the true process 
(p. 190). Other than complexity, a second criterion that governs model selection is the extent to 
which its assumptions and predictions conform to reality. In economics, where the use of 
mathematical modeling is more prevalent than in psychology, there has been a long and 
interesting debate on this issue with no particular consensus in the literature. 
 On the one hand, a number of economists believe that mathematical models should 
describe real-world phenomena. George Ainslie, for example, has recently criticized the quasi-
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hyperbolic delay discount function that is used extensively by behavioral economists as the 
standard model of impulsiveness, noting that its popularity stems more from “a desire to preserve 
the tractability of classical economic discount functions than from either parsimony or a need to 
fit experience” (Ainslie 2012, p. 4). His critique highlights an apparent willingness on the part of 
social scientists to trade off the empirical validity of their mathematical models for the sake of 
achieving sharp but often flawed predictions.  Other economists, such as Ariel Rubinstein, argue 
that mathematical models in economic theory are not meant to have any predictive power. In his 
account of dilemmas of an economic theorist (Rubinstein 2006),  Rubinstein noted that “the 
word „model‟ sounds more scientific than „fable‟ or „fairy tale‟ although I do not see much 
difference between them” (p. 881). 
Nonetheless, despite no unified consensus on the role of mathematical models in the 
social sciences, I believe that psychologists should not necessarily shy away from incorporating 
these models in their toolkit because they offer a powerful method for capturing the underlying 
behavioral and cognitive processes that they study. However, as Brown et al. (2013, p. 801) 
cautioned, they additionally should verify that the primary conditions for their valid application 
have been met. 
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